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Controlling above-cost predation:
an alternative to Weyerhaeuser
and Brooke Group
BY JOHN B. KIRKWOOD*
I. INTRODUCTION
The result in Weyerhaeuser was widely expected. The Supreme Court
had not ruled for a plaintiff in an antitrust case since 1993.' And the
principal practice at issue-predatory bidding-was similar in many
respects to predatory pricing, which the Court had addressed in three
prior cases and refused to condemn without proof that the defendant
* Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This article originated in testimony I gave at the Department of Jus-
tice/Federal Trade Commission Hearings on Predatory Pricing in June 2006. It also
benefited significantly from conversations with Peter Carstensen, Andy Gavil, War-
ren Grimes, Mike Haglund, Bob Lande, Doug Melamed, Steve Salop, Bob Skitol, Rick
Warren-Boulton, and Heather Kirkwood. I especially want to thank Pat Bolton, Bob
Taylor, and Dick Zerbe for reading a draft and offering insightful comments.
' Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127
S. Ct. 1069 (2007).
2 Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust Bookends: The 2006 Suprcme Court Term in
Historical Context, 22 ANTITRUST 21, 22 (2007). The Court's 2006 Term, in which
it decided Weyerhaeuser and three other antitrust cases, extended the string of
defense victories to 14. Id.
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had priced below cost and was likely to recoup its losses.' It was no
surprise, therefore, that the Court decided in Weyerhaeuser that a
predatory bidding plaintiff also had to show both below-cost pricing
and recoupment. As the Court noted, predatory bidding is "striking
similar"4 to predatory pricing.
Weyerhaeuser was troubling, however, for three reasons. First, the
Court created a safe harbor for above-cost bidding. After
Weyerhaeuser, aggressive bidding for inputs does not violate the
antitrust laws, even if it harms suppliers and consumers, so long as
the purchaser covers its costs.' Second, the decision created a virtual
safe harbor for all aggressive bidding, even when the purchaser may
have incurred losses. Weyerhaeuser adopted the same legal standard
as Brooke Group, and that standard has made it extremely difficult for
plaintiffs to prevail in any predatory pricing action.' As a result,
See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209 (1993); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
Predatory bidding occurs when a "purchaser of inputs 'bids up the market
price of a critical input to such high levels that rival buyers cannot survive (or
compete as vigorously) and, as a result, the predating buyer acquires (or
maintains or increases its) monopsony power.'" Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at
1075 (quoting John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct:
Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination
and Predatory Bidding?, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 625, 652 (2005)). Predatory bidding is
thus the mirror image of predatory pricing. See Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at
1076 ("A predatory-pricing plaintiff alleges that a predator cut prices to drive
the plaintiff out of business and, thereby, to reap monopoly profits from the
output market. In parallel fashion, a predatory-bidding plaintiff alleges that a
predator raised prices for a key input to drive the plaintiff out of business
and, thereby, to reap monopsony profits in the input market.").
4 127 S. Ct. at 1076.
Indeed, the purchaser may not need to cover all its costs to escape
liability. Under the Brooke Group standard, which the Court adopted in
Weyerhaeuser, all the defendant must do is cover an "appropriate measure of
its costs." Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223. While the Court did not define an
"appropriate measure" in either Brooke Group or Weyerhaeuser, lower courts
have generally picked marginal or average variable cost as the presumptive
standard. See infra note 59. As a result, a defendant may be able to use
aggressive bidding to knock out a rival and acquire monopsony power even
though it does not cover its fixed costs. In this article, "above cost" means
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Weyerhaeuser largely closed the door on future predatory bidding
cases. Finally, the decision increased the probability that other forms
of aggressive pricing, including market share discounts and bundled
rebates, will also be subject to Brooke Group's permissive below-
cost/recoupment standard. To date, the Court has exempted three
forms of pricing from liability so long as the defendant covers its
costs: predatory pricing, predatory bidding, and maximum resale
price maintenance.7 This pattern suggests that other types of
aggressive pricing will also be immunized, even when they reduce
the welfare of consumers or suppliers, so long as the defendant
avoids losses.'
above whatever measure of cost a court deciding the issue would deem
appropriate-usually marginal or average variable cost (or a comparable
measure like average avoidable cost) but possibly average total cost (or a
comparable measure like long-run incremental cost).
See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory
Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2258-60 (2000)
(reporting that in 36 predatory pricing cases decided after Brooke Group,
defendants won 33, typically on summary judgment or a motion to dismiss;
in the other three, plaintiffs prevailed on summary judgment; plaintiffs
obtained settlements in two of these cases; the outcome of the third could not
be determined; plaintiffs won no final judgments in any of the 36 cases).
7 In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990), the
Court held that a plaintiff cannot show antitrust injury from maximum resale
price maintenance unless the challenged prices were below cost. The Court
stated "Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set,
and so long as they are above predatory levels [i.e., above cost], they do not
threaten competition.... We have adhered to this principle regardless of the
type of antitrust claim involved." Id. at 340.
8 Indeed, citing Brooke Group, Weyerhaeuser, and Atlantic Richfield, the
Ninth Circuit recently decided to impose a below-cost test on bundled
discounts. The court stated that the Supreme Court's "reasoning poses a
strong caution against condemning bundled discounts that result in prices
above a relevant measure of costs." Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth,
502 F.3d 895, 912 (9th Cir. 2007). Wisely, the panel rejected the test proffered
by PeaceHealth, which would have compared the "discounted price of the
entire bundle" of products with the "incremental cost to produce the entire
bundle." Id. at 914. That test would allow a firm making substantial
monopoly profits on one of the products in its bundle to exclude an equally
HeinOnline  -- 53 Antitrust Bull. 371 2008
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The Court has offered two principal justifications for its repeated
reliance on above-cost safe harbors. First, above-cost safe harbors
promote competition based on efficiency. With an above-cost safe
harbor, a dominant firm need not hold a pricing umbrella over less
efficient firms. Instead, the dominant firm can use its cost advantage to
lower selling prices or raise input prices and drive these firms from the
market with little fear of antitrust liability.' Second, above-cost safe
harbors reduce the chilling effect of antitrust law on desirable price
competition. By making above-cost pricing and bidding legal, the
Court has given firms almost complete assurance that they can engage
in a broad range of aggressive behavior without antitrust sanction.
While some of this behavior may be predatory, most of it is not, and
trying to identify the predatory instances would, in the Court's words,
create "intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting."
10
efficient producer of another product, a result likely to harm consumers.
Instead, the court adopted a narrower, "discount attribution" test:
To prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or predatory for the
purposes of a monopolization or attempted monopolization claim under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must establish that, after allocating
the discount given by the defendant on the entire bundle of products to
the competitive product or products, the defendant sold the competitive
product or products below its average variable cost of producing them.
Id. at 920. While this standard would greatly limit a monopolist's ability to
exclude equally efficient rivals, it would still allow the exclusion of less
efficient rivals, a situation that may result in long-run consumer harm. The
alternative suggested in this article would reach that situation.
The dominant firm can drive out a less efficient rival by reducing its
selling price to a level that is above its own costs but below the costs of the
less efficient rival. Similarly, the dominant firm can bid up the market price of
a critical input to a level that causes the less efficient rival-but not the
dominant firm-to incur losses.
10 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223. In an oft-quoted sentence, the Court
referred to both justifications for above-cost safe harbors:
As a general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant
measure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged
predatory, and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the
practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting
intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting.
The Court reiterated both rationales in Weyerhaeuser. See 127 S. Ct. at 1074.
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Neither justification, however, compels a price-cost test. If the
point of the antitrust laws is to benefit consumers and suppliers,1" it is
not always desirable to allow a dominant firm to exclude a less
efficient rival. If the rival supplied a constraint on the dominant firm's
pricing power that would not otherwise exist, the destruction of the
rival would reduce the welfare of consumers or suppliers (or both),
even if it promotes competition based on efficiency. From a normative
perspective, in short, competition based on efficiency is not the right
goal. By immunizing above-cost predation, it is likely to generate a
significant number of false negatives.
12
Likewise, a below-cost test may not be the best way of protecting
desirable price competition from the risk of antitrust challenge. The
alternative explored in this article-a welfare/economic sense
standard-would also be a workable way of achieving that goal, and
may produce a better balance of false negatives and false positives.
Under this standard, a plaintiff would have to show that the
challenged behavior was likely to reduce the welfare of consumers (in
a predatory pricing case) or suppliers (in a predatory bidding case).
Furthermore, even if the plaintiff met this burden, the defendant
could escape liability by proving that its conduct made economic
sense apart from its anticompetitive gains.
This standard may well generate a better mix of outcomes than
the below-cost/recoupment standard of Weyerhaeuser and Brooke
Group. The proposed standard would reduce the number of false
negatives because it would reach above-cost pricing and bidding. At
the same time, it is unlikely to cause a significant increase in the
number of false positives. It would impose a heavy burden of proof
on the plaintiff and would afford the defendant a complete defense
for conduct that made economic sense without regard to its
' See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, Chicago's Foundation is
Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, Not Efficiency, in WHERE THE CHICAGO
SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON
U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed.) (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with
author) (generally, the ultimate goal of the antitrust laws is the welfare of
consumers, not economic efficiency; in monopsony power cases, the
overarching objective is the welfare of suppliers).
12 See infra part III.
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anticompetitive effects. This defense is likely to provide a workable
tool for businesses and courts because, in the version recommended
here, it is based on profitability calculations that a profit-maximizing
firm would make in the ordinary course of business. 3 In short, while
the issue cannot be finally resolved without more empirical evidence,
the welfare/economic sense standard may well be the preferable
approach in predatory pricing and predatory bidding cases, and
possible other types of aggressive pricing as well.
In exploring this issue, I focus on predatory bidding, in part
because the article was written for a symposium on buyer power.
More important, the proposed standard may be especially well suited
for predatory bidding since the danger of false positives seems to be
low in this area. Prior to Weyerhaeuser, there had been few suits
challenging predatory bidding and none had been successful against
a dominant firm." As a result, the Court could have departed from
Brooke Group and applied the suggested standard to predatory
bidding with relatively little fear of chilling procompetitive conduct.
Part II of this article reviews the facts and opinion in Weyerhaeuser.
Part III indicates that the behavior immunized in Weyerhaeuser and
" Several courts and commentators have adopted an economic sense
defense to claims of predatory pricing. More than twenty years ago, in
William Inglis v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1035-36 (9th Cir.
1981), the Ninth Circuit stated:
If, however, the plaintiff proves that the defendant's prices were below
average variable cost, the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of
predatory pricing and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the
prices were justified without regard to any anticipated destructive effect
they might have on competitors.
Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit endorsed this standard and continues to follow
it. See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 938 (6th Cir.
2005). See also Trace X Chem. Inc. v. Canadian Indus., Ltd., 738 F.2d 261, 266
(8th Cir. 1984) ("conduct without legitimate business purpose [is] conduct
[that] makes sense only because it eliminates competition"). Similarly,
Professors Bolton, Brodley, and Riordan would allow a defendant in a below-
cost pricing case to show that "a representative firm in the industry [would]
have anticipated the conduct to be profit-maximizing in the absence of
exclusionary effects." Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 6, at 2273.
"4 See iniifra text accompanying notes 38-40.
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Brooke Group-above-cost predation-is a significant concern, both
theoretically and empirically. Part IV describes the proposed
alternative and explains why it may well be superior to the existing
below-cost/recoupment standard. Part V summarizes the argument.
II. THE WEYERHAEUSER DECISION
Weyerhaeuser is the leading operator of hardwood sawmills in
the Pacific Northwest. As of 2001, it owned six mills and purchased
approximately 65% of the alder logs sold in the region.15 Ross-
Simmons had operated a hardwood sawmill in the Northwest since
1962, almost twenty years before Weyerhaeuser entered by
acquisition.16 After its entry, Weyerhaeuser invested almost $75
million in capital improvements and increased output at all of its
mills. 17 Despite the heightened competition, Ross-Simmons remained
profitable until the late 1990s, when the price of alder sawlogs rose
at the same time the price of finished hardwood lumber fell.1" This
price squeeze caused Ross-Simmons to lose money from 1998 to 2001
and ultimately forced it to shut down its mill. In contrast,
Weyerhaeuser's Pacific Northwest sawmill division continued to run
at a profit."
" Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127
S. Ct. 1069, 1072 (2007). The case focused on alder because "[r]ed alder is the
predominant species of hardwood sawlog harvested in the Pacific Northwest."
Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. 1069 (No. 05-381).
16 127 S. Ct. at 1072.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1073.
Id. Other sawmills also closed. See Confederated Tribes of Siletz
Indians v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F.3d 1030, 1044 n.57 (9th Cir. 2005), rev'd,
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct.
1069 (2007) (31 sawmills went out of business). Although four new mills
opened, they did not achieve a significant market share. Id. at 1044.
20 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 15, at 6 ("it is undisputed that
Weyerhaeuser and its alder sawmills in the Pacific Northwest operated at a
profit throughout the alleged predation period"). Ross-Simmons contended
that one of Weyerhaeuser's mills failed to cover its costs during part of the
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Ross-Simmons sued Weyerhaeuser for monopolization and
attempted monopolization, arguing, among other things, that
"Weyerhaeuser had overpaid for alder sawlogs to cause sawlog prices
to rise to artificially high levels as part of a plan to drive Ross-Simmons
out of business.' ' 21 Weyerhaeuser contended that its payments for
sawlogs were not predatory because they did not violate the below-cost
and recoupment tests established in Brooke Group. The district court
disagreed. It instructed the jury that it could find that Weyerhaeuser's
payments were anticompetitive if they met the following criteria:
One of Plaintiffs' contentions in this case is that the Defendant pur-
chased more logs than it needed or paid a higher price for logs than nec-
essary, in order to prevent the Plaintiffs from obtaining the logs they
needed at a fair price. If you find this to be true, you may regard it as an
anti-competitive act.22
The jury found for Ross-Simmons and returned a verdict (after
trebling) of approximately $79 million.3
The Ninth Circuit sustained this verdict. It held that Brooke Group
did not apply because "the concerns that led the Brooke Group Court to
establish a high standard of liability in the predatory-pricing context
do not carry over to this predatory bidding context with the same
force.' ' 24 The court observed, for example, that "because predatory
bidding cases attack a firm's decision to increase prices, not reduce
them, they do not represent a direct assault on price cutting."' The
price squeeze. According to Ross-Simmons, the Weyerhaeuser mill at
Longview, Washington, adjacent to Ross-Simmons' mill, received sawlogs
from a nearby Weyerhaeuser tree farm at below-market prices. Had this
subsidy been eliminated, Ross-Simmons argued, the mill would have
operated at a loss for part of the period 1997-2001. See Brief for Respondent at
13-14, Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. 1069 (No. 05-381).
21 127S. Ct. at 1073.
22 The district court's instructions also included a set of general
principles for distinguishing anticompetitive from procompetitive conduct.
See 411 F.3d at 1039 n.30.
23 127 S. Ct. at 1073.
24 411 F.3d at 1038.
25 Id. at 1037 n.14 (quoting Kirkwood, supra note 3, at 667). Chief Justice
Roberts made the same point during oral argument at the Supreme Court:
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Ninth Circuit held, therefore, that Weyerhaeuser's liability was
properly determined by the jury instructions given below. The court
stated that these instructions were "consistent with Supreme Court
precedent"26 and "as a whole provided sufficient guidance regarding
how to determine whether conduct was anticompetitive."
2 7
The guidance provided by the instructions, however, was
questionable. Only one instruction appeared to apply to predatory
bidding, and it was vague. This instruction made liability turn on
whether the defendant paid "more than necessary" for logs in order
to prevent the plaintiff from purchasing logs at a "fair price," but it
did not define either "necessary" or "fair." Nor did it refer the jury to
the other instructions, which contained general principles for
deciding whether Weyerhaeuser's behavior was anticompetitive.
Instead, the predatory bidding instruction simply declared that if
"you find this to be true" (i.e., if you find that Weyerhaeuser paid
"more than necessary" in order to prevent Ross-Simmons from
buying at a "fair price"), "you may regard it as an anti-competitive
act." Professor Hovenkamp called this instruction "an antitrust
disaster of enormous proportions.21
This instruction made it easy, therefore, for the Supreme Court to
reverse. If the Court had rejected Brooke Group, it would have had to
"Well, it's a little different here in that in the Brooke Group cases, of course, the
alleged anticompetitive conduct was pricing too low, which is at least a direct
benefit to consumers ... while here ... that's not the form the anticompetitive
conduct takes." Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. 1069
(No. 05-381). This point needs to be qualified, however, for a predatory
bidding complaint would usually represent an "indirect attack" on lower
consumer prices. Kirkwood, supra note 3, at 655 n.85. That is because higher
input prices frequently lead to lower output prices. By bidding up the market
price of a key input, a buyer is likely to increase the supply of that input,
which is likely to cause more output to be produced, which is likely to lower
the market price of that output, which would benefit consumers. See id. at 653.
The Supreme Court recognized this linkage when it stated: "Failed predatory-
bidding schemes can also.., benefit consumers." 127 S. Ct. at 1077.
26 411 F.3d at 1040.
27 Id. at 1039.
28 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Exclusionary Pricing, 2 COMPETITION
POL'Y INT'L 21, 38 (2006).
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choose another standard and the only one the Ninth Circuit approved
was amorphous. At oral argument, Justice Souter made precisely this
point. When counsel for Ross-Simmons noted that Weyerhaeuser had
argued that "the instruction was so standardless that the verdict
cannot stand,"29 Justice Souter responded: "But isn't that something
we have to consider because if ... we disagree with them on Brooke
Group, we've got to do it in the course of making a choice between a
Brooke Group instruction and something else, and the only
something else we've got right now is what we have in this case"3
and "that basically left the jury on... a free float, didn't it?"'"
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court reversed. In a unanimous
opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court ruled that predatory bidding
was so similar to predatory pricing that Brooke Group's below-cost and
recoupment requirements had to be satisfied. While the Court noted
some differences in the two practices, it concluded that the similarities
dominated." In many respects, the opinion was well crafted; it relied
heavily, for example, on published scholarship.3 But in extending
Brooke Group to predatory bidding, it neglected two significant issues.
First, the Court relied exclusively on the analytical similarities
between predatory bidding and predatory pricing to conclude that
"the risk of chilling procompetitive behavior.., is as serious here as it
was in Brooke Group."34 The Court never examined the empirical
evidence. In particular, it did not ask whether firms engaging in
2- Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 25, at 49.
30 Id.
'I Id. at 39. Years earlier, then-Judge Breyer had also objected to the
vagueness of a "fair price" standard. See Town of Concord v. Boston Edison
Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990) (asking "how ... a judge or jury [is] to
determine a 'fair price"').
32 See 127 S. Ct. at 1076-78.
13 See id. at 1075-77 (citing, for example, Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (2005); Roger G. Noll,
"Buyer Power" and Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 589 (2005); ROGER D.
BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS
(1993); and Kirkwood, supra note 3).
34 127S. Ct. at 1078.
HeinOnline  -- 53 Antitrust Bull. 378 2008
CONTROLLING ABOVE-COST PREDATION : 379
aggressive bidding were as likely to be sued-and sued
successfully-as firms engaging in aggressive price cutting. In fact,
the historical record showed sharp differences. Prior to 1975, when
Areeda and Turner first advocated a price-cost test,35 plaintiffs
brought numerous cases challenging predatory pricing and won a
large percentage.' Even after Brooke Group was decided, a substantial
amount of litigation continued over predatory pricing, although the
plaintiffs' success rate plummeted.37 In contrast, in the century after
the passage of the Sherman Act, Blair and Harrison found only three
suits challenging predatory bidding." And although two were
successful, both involved conspiracies. 9 Prior to the cases against
Weyerhaeuser, no plaintiff had ever obtained a final judgment or
settlement in a predatory bidding case against a dominant firm.4"
Given this record, the Court had less reason to fear false positives and
more reason to choose an alternative to Brooke Group.
The Court's second error was to extend Brooke Group to predatory
bidding claims without considering whether an alternative standard
would have been preferable. While the jury instruction given below
should not have been adopted, the Court did not ask whether there
was an approach between that instruction and Brooke Group, an
approach that would achieve a better balance of false positives and
35 See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
36 Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 6, at 2250 ("[o]ut of a total of 123
federal cases from 1890 to 1971, the prey was legally adjudged to have
suffered predatory injury in 95 cases, or 77% of the cases brought") (citing
Roland H. Koller II, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study,
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., Summer 1971, at 105, 110).
37 See supra note 6.
38 See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 33, at 66-69, 154-56.
39 See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Reid Bros.
Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1983).
40 See also Brief for the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 25-26, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007) (No. 05-381) [hereinafter
AAI Briej] (prior to Weyerhaeuser, there were no litigated cases "involving
single-firm monopsony conduct [of any type] under Section 2").
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false negatives. At oral argument, Justice Breyer suggested just such a
standard. In discussing the overbuying allegation in the case, he
offered his own "key" to distinguishing anticompetitive from
procompetitive behavior:
If you're trying to decide whether people are hogging goods unnecessar-
ily for bad purposes, or rather storing up nuts for winter for good pur-
poses, then a very good key to that is do these people expect in the long
run to make money out of this without driving those victims out?41
Later, he rephrased his test in more general terms: "whether it was
in their economic interest in the absence of any intent to monopolize
these people to buy all these logs or not."' 2 Justice Breyer was of course
proposing the "no economic sense" test, a test that has been much
discussed recently. 3 This article suggests that the optimal approach to
controlling predation may involve a combination of the no economic
sense test and a welfare test. In Weyerhaeuser, however, the Court did
not address whether the no economic sense test, a welfare/economic
sense standard, or any other alternative was superior to Brooke Group.'
One reason why a welfare/economic sense standard may be
preferable is that it would reach above-cost predation.
41 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 25, at 31-32.
42 Id. at 41.
43 See Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2:
The "No Economic Sense" Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413 (2006); A. Douglas
Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Conduct-Are
There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375 (2006); Steven C. Salop,
Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice
Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311 (2006); Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary
Conduct: Section 2, the Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying
Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435 (2006).
4 In Justice Thomas' defense, none of the parties or their amici
advocated an alternative test. Weyerhaeuser and its amici recommended that
the Court reverse the Ninth Circuit and apply Brooke Group. See, e.g., Brief for
the Petitioner, supra note 15, at 10-12, 50; Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7-9, 30, Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. 1069 (No. 05-
381); Brief for Amici Curiae Business Roundtable and National Association of
Manufacturers in Support of Petitioner at 3-4, 20, Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. 1069
(No. 05-381). Ross-Simmons and its amici urged the Court to affirm the Ninth
Circuit's decision. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, supra note 20, at 24-27,
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III. ABOVE-COST PREDATION
As this article noted at the outset, the below-cost/recoupment test
of Weyerhaeuser and Brooke Group has substantial benefits: it promotes
competition based on efficiency and it reduces the chilling effect of
antitrust liability on desirable pricing and bidding."s It also has one
major drawback: it protects above-cost pricing and bidding even when
they are predatory." This drawback is significant for two reasons. First,
above-cost predation is a well-recognized theoretical possibility. As
numerous commentators have emphasized, above-cost predation can
occur and can reduce the welfare of consumers and/or suppliers.
Second, recent cases have revealed several plausible examples of it.
50; AAI Brief, supra note 40, at 4-5, 29; Brief of Amicus Curiae States of
California, Oregon, Arizona, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin in Support of Respondent, at 7-10, 30, Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. 1069
(No. 05-381) [hereinafter States Brief]. No party or amicus recommended that
the Court reverse the Ninth Circuit and adopt a test other than Brooke Group.
Although AAI and the States argued that the Ninth Circuit's analysis was
consistent with the no economic sense test, AAI Brief supra note 40, at 8, States
Brief, supra, at 29, neither contended that the Court should adopt the no
economic sense test in lieu of the jury instructions given below.
45 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
' The below-cost test adopted by Weyerhaeuser and Brooke Group also has
another drawback. In some cases, it requires courts to address thorny issues
of cost measurement and allocation, raising the expense of litigation and
reducing business certainty. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and
Chicago Schools and the Dominant Firm, in WHERE THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
OVERSHOT THE MARK: EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S.
ANTITRUST 132 (Robert Pitofsky ed.) (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with
the author) ("[i]n some cases measuring [price-cost relations] is extraordinarily
difficult, particularly if the defendant produces multiple products with
common costs"); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 167 (2d ed. 2006) ("determining
average variable cost has proven difficult and costly"). As a result, the below-
cost test may not provide clear guidance in a significant number of cases. In
both American Airlines and Spirit, for example, there was considerable dispute
over the relevant measure of cost. See infra notes 87-88 & 98-101 and
accompanying text. To be sure, an economic sense defense would present
comparable problems, since it too would require courts and businesses to
assess the profitability of particular conduct. There appears to be no reason,
however, why an economic sense test would entail more difficult problems of
cost measurement and allocation than a below-cost test. See infra part IV.
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While none of these cases is definitive, together they suggest that the
phenomenon deserves the attention of antitrust policymakers.
A. Widely recognized possibility
As numerous scholars have written, pricing above costs can be
predatory. Professor Hovenkamp states: "Manifestly, the law of
predatory pricing does not rest on the premise that anticompetitive,
above cost pricing strategies are implausible. In fact, such theories are
quite numerous and varied."47 Professors Bolton, Brodley, and Riordan
concur: "A [below-cost] standard can be faulted as... under-inclusive,
because prices above cost can be both predatory and injurious to
competition."'" Professor Baker agrees: "A firm can deter aggressive
competition with a low price, even if the low price exceeds the price-
cutter's average cost, so long as the price is sufficiently low relative to
its rivals' cost. Hence, it is possible that competition can be harmed by
low prices even if those prices are not below the price-cutter's cost."4"
47 Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 148-49 (citing JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 367-74 (1992); FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 356-66, 405-06 (3d
ed. 1990); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 269-76 (2d ed. 1968)).
4- Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 6, at 2271 (citing Richard
Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The ReaLemon Case,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 994, 1021 (1979)). Accord, Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley &
Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Response to Critique and Further
Elaboration, 89 GEO. L.J. 2495, 2516 n.114 (2001) ("economic theory ... does not
require that a predatory price be below [any] measure of cost").
4 Jonathan Baker, Predatory Pricing after Brooke Group: An Economic
Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 591 (1994). Accord, Joseph P. Guiltinan &
Gregory T. Gundlach, Aggressive and Predatory Pricing: A Framework for
Analysis, 60 J. MARKETING 87, 94 (1996) ("scholars adopting a dynamic
perspective of competition have shown that the aims of predation may be
achieved even at above-cost prices"). In their framework for analyzing
predatory pricing, which combines price theory with insights from
marketing, Professors Guiltinan and Gundlach would not exempt above-cost
price cuts that are likely to harm consumer welfare. Id. at 95. They also
emphasize that in evaluating the impact of aggressive price cuts on consumer
welfare, courts should recognize that rivals may react not by exiting but by
"nonprice responses, such as reducing research and development,
advertising, customer service, or variety." Id. at 96.
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Professors Sullivan and Grimes declare: "[U]nder some circumstances
even prices above full cost may intentionally discourage entry or
aggressive price competition, or drive out a rival."" ° Professor Edlin
elaborates: "An incumbent monopoly with a significant cost or
noncost advantage over entrants-a situation this Essay argues is
common for monopolies--can use these advantages to drive entrants
from the market by pricing below their cost, above its own .... [T]his
strategy is quite credible and effective"" and harms consumers.52
Professor Elhauge agrees that above-cost pricing is a serious concern. 3
As Edlin explains, above-cost pricing or bidding can be predatory
when a dominant firm possesses significant advantages over entrants.
These advantages allow the dominant firm to maintain its own
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 46, at 168. Professors Sullivan and
Grimes would use a "structured rule of reason" to evaluate claims of price
predation. Id. at 174-78. Like the standard suggested in this article, their
approach would not demand proof of below-cost pricing. Instead of an
economic sense defense, however, they would allow a multiplicity of other
defenses-for broad-based and durable price reductions, promotional
pricing, meeting competition, and cost savings.
51 Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941,
944 (2002).
5? See id. ("higher-cost rivals will not even attempt entry, and consumers
may never enjoy low prices. If entrants who would price below the monopoly
are excluded from the market, consumers are worse off than if the low-cost
monopoly did not exist"). See also id. at 991 ("consumers often need inefficient
entrants").
5- Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not
Predatory-and the Inplications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE
L.J. 681, 686 (2003) ("The concern is that [above-cost] price cuts not only drive
out entrants, but deter similar entry in the future, and thus allow the more
efficient incumbent to perpetuate monopoly prices that exceed the price the
next most efficient firm would charge .... This is a serious concern.").
Elhauge disagrees, however, with Edlin's policy prescription. In contrast to
the approach suggested in this article, Edlin would deal with above-cost
predation by making it impossible for a monopolist to respond at all to low-
priced entry for a significant period of time. See Edlin, supra note 51, at 946
(normally, "if an entrant prices twenty percent below an incumbent
monopoly, the incumbent's prices will be frozen for twelve to eighteen
months"). Elhauge opposes this proposal on numerous grounds.
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profitability while forcing the entrant to incur losses. For example, if
the dominant firm has lower variable costs, it can bid up input prices
to a level that prevents the entrant from covering its average variable
costs while the dominant firm continues to cover its own. Similarly, if
the dominant firm has lower fixed costs, it can reduce its selling price
to a level just above average total cost and prevent the entrant from
recovering its fixed expenses. When combined with the other
elements of a credible predatory strategy,' such advantages allow a
dominant firm to engage in successful predation without violating the
Weyerhaeuser/Brooke Group below-cost test.5
A dominant firm can also engage in successful above-cost predation
where its advantages over entrants are only temporary, provided they
are large enough in magnitude and duration that the entrant exits or
competes less aggressively. Suppose, for example, that a dominant firm
markets a differentiated product that commands considerable brand
loyalty. As a result, an entrant would have to charge a significantly
lower price for a substantial period of time, inducing enough
consumers to switch to its product that it attains the scale required for
profitability. Alternatively, the entrant may have to incur significantly
higher production costs than the dominant firm for a substantial period
of time because of learning-by-doing economies. Under either
circumstance, the dominant firm can react to entry with above-cost
prices (or payments for inputs) that cause the entrant to incur
significant losses for a substantial period of time. These losses may
induce exit, deter future entry, or discourage further investment in the
industry, permitting the dominant firm to preserve its pricing power
without triggering liability under Weyerhaeuser or Brooke Group.6
54 See infra note 112.
55 As Hovenkamp notes, this means that Judge Posner's definition of
exclusionary conduct-conduct capable of excluding an equally or more
efficient rival-is under inclusive. While above-cost pricing and bidding may
not exclude an equally efficient entrant, such conduct can reduce consumer
welfare "where the rival that is most likely to emerge is less efficient than the
dominant firm." Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 142.
" See Schmalensee, supra note 48, at 1021 (brand loyalty and learning-by-
doing economies allow a dominant firm to exclude an entrant without pricing
below cost). Accord, Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 6, at 2271;
Ashutosh Dixit, Gregory T. Gundlach, Naresh K. Malhotra & Fred C. Allvine,
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Several types of advantages can allow a dominant firm to engage
in above-cost predation. In addition to brand loyalty and learning-by-
doing economies, a dominant firm may possess patents or trade
secrets that enable it to produce a better product than the entrant or a
comparable product at lower costs. A dominant firm may also benefit
from demand-side network effects that enhance the value of its
product. For example, if the dominant firm's product is widely used,
consumers may also be able to purchase an extensive array of
Aggressive and Predatory Pricing: Insights and Empirical Examination in the
Airline Industry, 25 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 1, 8 (2006) (above-cost pricing
may exclude an entrant "when customers are not familiar with competitors'
offerings or their decisions are heavily influenced by attributes such as brand
equity or previous experience with the dominant brand"). Schmalensee and
Melamed point out, moreover, that it is not entirely correct to call an entrant
subject to such temporary disadvantages a "less efficient" entrant. If the
entrant is likely to attain cost parity with the dominant firm if allowed to
remain in the market, the entrant could be viewed as an "equally efficient"
entrant from a dynamic perspective. Schmalensee, supra note 48, at 1021;
Melamed, supra note 43, at 388 ("a rival that is less efficient today might
become equally or more efficient if permitted time to develop learning-by-
doing economies or if its sales grew and enabled it to gain scale economies").
In this sense, above-cost pricing can exclude equally efficient entrants.
Professor Elhauge asserts that a monopolist cannot use above-cost pricing
to exclude an entrant with temporary disadvantages. He acknowledges that
"the initially less efficient entrant will suffer start-up losses if the incumbent's
above-cost price is below the entrant's initial costs," Elhauge, supra note 53, at
782, but he argues that the capital markets will fund these losses "if entry by
an initially less efficient firm is itself efficient and desirable." Id. at 783. He
concedes, however, that the only way the capital markets would fund these
losses is if the entrant is likely to earn a sufficient return to cover all its costs,
including its start-up losses. See id. Yet the very point of the incumbent's
predatory price cuts is to prevent the entrant from covering all its costs. What
Elhauge is really arguing, therefore, is not that a temporarily inefficient
entrant cannot be excluded, but that it ought to be excluded where its entry
would reduce economic efficiency. Elhauge contends that its entry may
reduce efficiency because, to the extent the entrant captures business,
production would be shifted from the efficient incumbent to the inefficient
entrant. Id. From a consumer welfare perspective, however, this temporary
inefficiency is desirable if entry leads to lower consumer prices. The ultimate
problem with Professor Elhauge's argument, in short, is that it rests on the
judgment that antitrust policy ought to be driven by economic efficiency
rather than by the welfare of consumers and suppliers.
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complementary products, while it may take years before a similar
array is developed to support the entrant's product. On the supply
side, a dominant firm may possess economies of scale or scope that an
entrant cannot easily duplicate, given its other disadvantages. A
dominant firm may also possess superior access to capital, possibly
because of its size but more likely because it has a track record in the
industry than no entrant can match.57
Economic theory indicates, in short, that dominant firms can
engage in successful above-cost predation, injuring not only the rivals
they exclude but consumers and suppliers as well. Recent case law
suggests, moreover, that above-cost predatory pricing and predatory
bidding are not just theoretical concerns.
B. Plausible instances of above-cost predation
In four recent cases, two from the timber industry and two from
the airline industry, a dominant firm (or combination of dominant
firms) excluded one or more significant rivals by aggressively bidding
up the price of a critical input or aggressively reducing the price of its
output. 8 In all of these cases, moreover, the dominant firms did not,
or arguably did not, violate the prevailing below-cost test. To the
contrary, the courts found or there was substantial evidence that these
firms continued to earn revenues sufficient to cover their marginal or
average variable costs." Finally, after the rivals were excluded, the
S7 See, e.g., Edlin, supra note 51, at 943 n.12 & 959 (describing numerous
advantages); Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 15 (noting that a dominant firm
can typically finance litigation more readily than an entrant).
8 In the airline cases, the dominant carriers also aggressively expanded
capacity on the relevant routes, offering more flights or larger planes than
they had before the rivals appeared.
5, Brooke Group declared that a plaintiff challenging predatory pricing
must show that the defendant's prices were "below an appropriate measure
of costs." Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 223 (1993). While the Court did not specify the appropriate cost measure
in either Brooke Group or Weyerhaeuser, lower court decisions have generally
ruled that pricing below average variable or marginal cost creates a
presumption of predatory pricing. See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 938 (6th Cir. 2005) (proof of pricing below average
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dominant firms reduced input prices or raised selling prices
substantially, or there was a dangerous probability that this would
happen. All these cases, in short, represent plausible instances of
above-cost predation.6
1. PREDATORY BIDDING
(a) Reid Brothers.6" In the 1960s and early 1970s, Ketchikan Pulp
Company, a subsidiary of Georgia-Pacific, and Alaska Lumber and
Pulp Company were the leading operators of pulp plants and
variable cost establishes prima facie case of predatory pricing, shifting burden
to defendant to justify its pricing). Some courts, moreover, require pricing
below marginal cost or a comparable measure. See, e.g., Cascade Health
Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895, 920 (9th Cir. 2007) ("we hold that the
appropriate measure of costs for our cost-based standard is average variable
cost"), id. at n.19 (criticizing average total cost as "inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's instruction in Brooke Group that predatory prices are those
below 'some measure of incremental cost"') (quoting Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at
223 (emphasis added)); United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1116 (10th
Cir. 2003) (appropriate measure is marginal cost or an accurate and reliable
proxy for marginal cost; commonly accepted proxy is average variable cost).
See also Hovenkamp, supra note 28, at 22 ("[w]hile the U.S. Supreme Court has
never passed judgment on the correct price/cost test for predatory pricing,
the U.S. Circuit Courts have generally agreed that either marginal cost or
average variable cost is the correct number"); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 276-81 (6th ed. 2007) (most circuits presume
that prices below marginal or average variable cost are predatory; no
presumption attaches if prices are below average total cost, though a plaintiff
may show that such prices were in fact predatory; some circuits insist on
pricing below marginal or average variable cost). In all the instances
described below, the courts found or there was substantial evidence that the
defendants covered their marginal or average variable costs.
NJ These cases are plausible rather than definitive instances of above-cost
predation for three reasons. First, because the defendants did not, or arguably
did not, cover their full costs, some courts might have held that they violated
the below-cost test. Second, none of the decisions reached a final judgment as
to whether the challenged conduct was profitable for the defendant or
harmful on balance to consumers or suppliers. Third, the facts of the cases are
drawn from the appellate opinions cited below, not a review of the
underlying records.
"' Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir.
1983).
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sawmills in southeastern Alaska. Together, they accounted for over
90% of the output in the area. 2 Acting in concert, they drove out
independent sawmills and foreclosed new entry through a variety of
tactics, including bidding up the price of timber.' When a Japanese
paper company built a mill in the area, for example, the Ketchikan
timber manager noted that it was causing trouble by "offering higher
prices for logs.' '6 In response, he suggested that Ketchikan "run [the
bidding] up on [the Japanese mill] to the point it will really hurt.""
Later, the Ketchikan general manager declared that "we should bid
all [timber] sales to keep [the Japanese mill and other actual and
potential operators] out."' Ketchikan and Alaska Pulp carried out
this plan, bidding up the price of timber 7 and eliminating six
competing mills.68 In the process, the defendants covered their
marginal costs and possibly their other costs as well, since the court
never indicated they had to lose money in order to accomplish their
predatory scheme. 0 After competition had been suppressed, the
.2 Id. at 1295, 1299. The Ninth Circuit referred to them as "the two giants
of the southeast Alaska lumber industry." Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1297-98.
Id. at 1297.
"5 Id. While the general manager cautioned against "the danger of
making one bid too many," id., it does not appear that Ketchikan and Alaska
Lumber simply induced their rivals to pay higher prices for logs. Instead, the
defendants paid higher prices themselves. See id. at 1298 n.5 (referring to "the
high prices paid for standing timber" by the defendants) & 1298 (describing
defendants' use of front corporations "to bid preclusively on [government]
timber sales").
1 Id.
"7 See suipra note 65.
699 F.2d at 1297.
Id. at 1298 n.5 ("there was no evidence that the high prices paid for
standing timber would prevent the defendants from covering their marginal
costs on the ultimate sale of the processed timber").
70 Ruling before Brooke Group, the Ninth Circuit rejected the application
of a price-cost test to the defendants' predatory bidding, id., sustaining the
jury verdict for Reid Brothers. Id. at 1298-99.
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defendants lowered their payments for timber to "artificially depressed
levels. ""'
Although Reid Brothers involved a conspiracy, rather than a dominant
firm, a single sawmill with a 90% share could have carried out the
predatory scheme at least as easily as the two defendants did. And the
scheme may well have been profitable to the defendants and harmful to
the long-run welfare of timber owners and consumers. While the Ninth
Circuit did not address the recoupment and welfare issues directly, it did
conclude that the defendants had reduced payments for timber to
"artificially depressed levels."' It also found that the defendants had not
only "eliminate[d] existing independent mills" but "prevent[ed] the
establishment of new operations [and] frustrate[ed] the efforts of
potential entrants,"73 which would have allowed noncompetitive timber
payments to persist for a significant period of time.'
(b) Weyerhaeuser. As described above, 5 Weyerhaeuser, the dominant
operator of hardwood sawmills in the Pacific Northwest, bid up the price
of alder sawlogs while the price of finished hardwood lumber fell,
eliminating many competing mills. This conduct created a dangerous
probability of monopsony power," but did not cause Weyerhaeuser's
71 Id. at 1297:
The evidence clearly shows a well-orchestrated and successful effort by
[the defendants] to eliminate existing independent mills and prevent the
establishment of new operations through control of the timber supply. By
frustrating the efforts of potential entrants into the market, the defen-
dants were able to minimize competition and keep stumpage rates and
payments to purchase loggers at artificially depressed levels.
7 Id.
73 Id.
74 Accord, Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., Monopsony and the Ross-Simmons Case: A
Comment on Salop and Kirkzvood, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 717 (2005) (Reid Brothers
presented the circumstances in which predatory bidding is most likely to
succeed and injure consumers: a relatively inelastic input supply in the short
run, a more elastic supply in the long run, and a relatively elastic (but not
perfectly elastic) demand for the final product).
75 See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
76 See Weyerhaeuser, 411 F.3d at 1043-45 (sustaining the jury's finding
based on Weyerhaeuser's market share, its past ability to influence timber
prices, and the existence of entry barriers).
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hardwood sawmill division to lose money.' Although the Ninth
Circuit did not address whether Weyerhaeuser was likely to exercise
this power for long enough to recoup its earlier profit sacrifice and
inflict net harm on timber owners or consumers, 8 the case is
sufficiently similar to Reid Brothers that Weyerhaeuser may well have
engaged in successful above-cost predation.'
2. PREDATORY PRICING
(a) American Airlines.' By May 2000, American Airlines had preserved
its status as the dominant carrier at the Dallas/Fort Worth airport
(DFW), accounting for more than 70% of the passengers boarding at
that terminal." Delta Airlines, which also maintained a hub at DFW,
had a share of 18%."' While eight low-cost airlines had begun
offering flights into and out of DFW in the period between 1995 and
7 See supra note 20.
78 As Professor Zerbe noted, Ross-Simmons' complaint included
"allegations of consumer harm in the form of reduced plantings of alder
seedlings by industrial and small woodland owners, with the obvious long-
term effects on future supplies of log inputs and lumber outputs." Zerbe,
supra note 74, at 723. At trial, however, "Ross-Simmons did not present direct
evidence in support of these allegations." Id. at 724. In its brief to the Supreme
Court, Ross-Simmons explained that it did not introduce evidence of these
long-run effects because Weyerhaeuser successfully withheld significant
documents from discovery. These documents were later unsealed in other
cases against Weyerhaeuser. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 20, at 2-3.
7q See Zerbe, supra note 74, at 725 (noting the parallels between Reid
Brothers and Weyerhaeuser and concluding that the "evidence presented in
[Weyerhaeuser] was sufficient to support a finding of consumer harm,
particularly since consumer benefit was not established"). Contra, Salop,
supra note 33, at 709-14 (asserting that Weyerhaeuser's behavior was
procompetitive and, at a minimum, was unlikely to harm consumers since
the relevant output market was found to be all hardwood lumber, not alder
lumber, and Weyerhaeuser's share of this market was just 3%). Professor
Zerbe testified for Ross-Simmons at trial, Professor Salop consulted for
Weyerhaeuser, and I advised Ross-Simmons at the Ninth Circuit and
Supreme Court.
.' United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1112.
Id.
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2000,1 their entry had not captured a significant volume of the traffic.
As of May 2000, their total market share was just 2.4%, much less than
the shares of low-cost carriers at several other major airports.'
American had responded aggressively to the entry of these discount
airlines. First, it matched their fares on the routes they served,"5 even
though travelers tended to prefer American at an equal fare because of
its multiple advantages.' Second, American expanded its capacity on
these routes, increasing the number of its flights or the size of its planes.
Third, American raised the proportion of its seats that were available at
the new, lower prices. Despite these moves, American's revenues
continued to cover its average variable costs, 7 and the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the government had not shown that American's prices
had fallen below any "appropriate measure of cost."'
Because of American's behavior, however, the low-cost carriers
ceased or curtailed their operations and American raised fares and
reduced flights to approximately their pre-entry levels."9 As a result,
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1112 & n.2 (low-cost carriers accounted for more than 15% of the
passengers boarding at Denver, for example, and almost 17% boarding at
Atlanta).
85 Id. at 1112.
86 See Edlin, supra note 51, at 943 n.12 (American has "many advantages
over entrants like Vanguard" [one of the low-cost carriers], including a
superior brand-name reputation, more flights per day, and a more valuable
frequent flyer program; as a result, "at an equal price ... American's flights
will be fuller").
87 335 F.3d at 1120 ("it is uncontested that American did not price below
[average variable costs] for any route as a whole").
88 Id. at 1120. See also id. at 1116-20 (rejecting the government's alternate
cost measures).
R. Id. at 1112:
In each instance, American's response produced the same result: the com-
peting [low-cost carrier] failed to establish a presence, moved its opera-
tions, or ceased its separate existence entirely. Once the [low-cost carrier]
ceased or moved its operations, American generally resumed its prior
marketing strategy, reducing flights and raising prices to levels roughly
comparable to those prior to the alleged episode of predatory activity.
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American restored its "hub premium," the higher price that major
airlines can charge at concentrated hubs when they do not face
discount competition." Although the court did not address whether
American could charge this premium long enough to recoup the
profit sacrifice it made when it cut prices, expanded capacity, and
reduced the revenue yield of each flight, both recoupment and
consumer harm were plausible outcomes in this case, since
American's position was protected by barriers to entry and mobility.
American had numerous cost advantages over the cheaper airlines, 1
and it had established a reputation for aggression by responding
vigorously to the entry of several of them, forcing them to retrench.2
(b) Northwest Airlines.3 In 1995, Northwest Airlines was the dominant
carrier at the Detroit Metro airport, controlling 64 of its 86 gates and
carrying 78% of the passengers who traveled from the airport.'4 In late
1995 and early 1996, Spirit Airlines, a discount carrier, began offering
service on two routes that Northwest dominated, Detroit-Boston and
"I Id. at 1111-12:
Passengers traveling to a concentrated hub tend to pay higher average
fares than those traveling on comparable routes that do not include a con-
centrated hub as an endpoint. This is known as the "hub premium" and a
major airline's hub is often an important profit center. Entry of low cost
carriers ("LCCs") into a hub market tends to drive down the fares
charged by major carriers. Consequently, major carriers generally enjoy
higher margins on routes where they do not face LCC competition.
' See supra note 86.
The district court disagreed, granting summary judgment for
American on the recoupment issue. 335 F.3d at 1113. The Tenth Circuit did not
reach the question, however, affirming only on the below-cost issue. Id. at
1120-21. In a comparable case, the Sixth Circuit found that a reasonable fact-
finder could conclude that the defendant's hub was protected by significant
barriers to entry-barriers high enough to enable the defendant to recoup its
profit sacrifice. See infra note 103 (noting, for example, that a dominant carrier
may be in a position to limit competitors' access to airport space). See also
Dixit et al., sutpra note 56, at 7 (entry barriers can exist when an entrant must
pay fees to an incumbent to lease access to gates or landing slots).
", Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 413 F.3d 917 (6th Cir.
2005).
1 Id. at 923.
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Detroit-Philadelphia.95 Northwest responded with dramatic fare
reductions and increased flight capacity on both routes, undercutting
Spirit.96 Within months, Spirit exited both markets and Northwest
curtailed the number of flights on these routes and raised fares sharply 7
The district court ruled that Northwest had not engaged in
predatory pricing because its revenues had exceeded its average
variable costs.9 Reversing, the Sixth Circuit held that a reasonable
trier of fact could find that Northwest had priced below its variable
costs on both routes.' The issue was close, however, as an extensive
concurring opinion by Judge Moore made clear. Laying out the
arguments on both sides, she concluded that both sides' experts have
presented "credible opinions" and that a reasonable trier of fact could
come out either way on the price-cost issue." If the case is not settled,
therefore, it is quite possible that Northwest will be found to have
priced above an appropriate measure of cost.1 If so, the case would
present an especially plausible example of above-cost predation. The
Sixth Circuit held that a trier of fact could reasonably find that
"Northwest recouped any losses from its predatory pricing quickly
after Spirit left these routes"'' - and that consumers were likely to be
harmed "for the foreseeable future.' '03
Id. at 922-23, 935.
Id. at 923-24.
7 Id. at 924, 935-36.
,8 Indeed, the district court granted summary judgment for Northwest
on the below-cost issue. Id. at 925.
Id. at 945.
100 Id. at 958.
101 Like the parties' experts, the majority and Judge Moore focused on
variable costs as the most appropriate cost measure. See id. at 939-45, 956-58.
While the majority noted that Northwest could be found liable for pricing
below average total cost, see id. at 951-52, it seems unlikely, given the state of
the case law, see supra note 59, that Northwest would lose if it were ultimately
found to have covered its variable costs.
102 Id. at 950.
103 Id. at 951 ("leisure travelers to Boston and Philadelphia ... suffered
not only a reduction in the supply of flights to these cities, but, to travel these
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In these four cases, in short, defendants aggressively lowered
their selling prices or raised their buying prices, harmed smaller
rivals, and quite possibly reduced consumer or supplier welfare, yet
they did not, or plausibly did not, fail to cover an appropriate
measure of their costs. Under Brooke Group and Weyerhaeuser,
therefore, these plausible instances of predation either were or could
be beyond the reach of current law.' There is reason, then, to
consider replacing the Brooke Group/Weyerhaeuser standard with a
more flexible standard, a standard that would cover above-cost
routes, had to pay an almost seven-fold price increase. With the 'very high'
barriers to entry, the consumers for this route likely would not have any
viable alternatives to Northwest Airlines for the foreseeable future"). The
court concluded that barriers were very high because "the record reveals that
Northwest controlled sixty-four of the seventy-eight gates at the Detroit
airport under long-term leases." Id. at 947. In contrast, "Spirit had to pay
$100,000 to access a gate as well as 25% higher landing fees than airlines with
long-term leases." Id. In addition, the court relied on scholarship indicating
that the dominant carrier at a hub may be able to limit an entrant's access to
airport space. See id. (citing Note, Compatibility and Interconnection Pricing in
the Airline Industry: A Proposal for Reform, 114 YALE L.J. 405, 424 (2004) ("an
airline's dominant presence at its hub may allow it to exert veto power over
any plans to expand the airport's capacity") and Note, The Antitrust
Inplications of Airport Lease Restrictions, 104 HARV. L. REV. 548, 567 (1990)
("[w]hen an airline controls a substantial percentage of enplanements at an
airport, it wields significant power over its competitors' access to airport
space")).
104 The defendants did escape liability in two of the cases (Weyerhaeuser
and American Airlines). In a third (Northwest Airlines), the plaintiff prevailed
on summary judgment, but as Judge Moore's concurring opinion made clear,
the defendant may ultimately win on the cost issue if the case is not settled.
Only in Reid Brothers did the plaintiff obtain a final judgment, but that case
was decided before Brooke Group and Weyerhaeuser.
There may have been other plausible instances of above-cost predation in
the airline industry. A recent empirical study identified seven markets in the
1990s in which a major airline's pricing response to entry was "consistent
with the evidence that the Supreme Court requires to determine predatory
pricing practices." Dixit et al., supra note 56, at 19. Although the study was
unable to examine any airline's costs, it found pricing behavior that was
consistent with recoupment: "in the seven markets in which a discount airline
entered and then subsequently exited, the dominant airline cut its prices and
then increased its prices over time to the same or higher levels than those
before the entry of the discounter." Id.
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predation but would also limit the chilling effect of antitrust litigation
on desirable price competition. This standard-the welfare/economic
sense standard-is described and evaluated in part IV.
IV. THE WELFARE/ECONOMIC SENSE STANDARD
Section IV.A describes the welfare/economic sense standard in
more detail. Section IV.B shows that the economic sense defense
presented here is likely to be workable in predation cases and that the
combination of this defense with a welfare test may produce a better
balance of false negatives and false positives than existing law.
A. Elements of the standard
Under the welfare/economic sense standard, a plaintiff could not
establish a claim of predatory bidding or predatory pricing without
showing that the defendant's conduct was likely to reduce the welfare
of suppliers or consumers.' 5 While the plaintiff would not need to
show that the defendant failed to cover its costs, the defendant could
escape liability by establishing that its conduct was expected to be
profitable regardless of whether it produced anticompetitive gains.
1. PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN: HARM TO WELFARE The plaintiff would have
to demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was likely to cause a net
adverse effect on the welfare of suppliers or consumers. In a
predatory bidding case, the plaintiff would have to show harm to
suppliers; in a predatory pricing case, it would have to establish harm
to consumers."6
To demonstrate probable harm to suppliers in a predatory
bidding case, the plaintiff would have to establish four propositions.'" 7
First, the defendant's conduct likely raised the price that one or more
rivals paid for a critical input. Second, this price increase likely
)05 In an attempted monopolization case, the plaintiff would have to
show only a dangerous probability of harm to welfare.
"' For the reasons why supplier welfare is the appropriate goal in a
predatory bidding case and consumer welfare is the appropriate goal in a
predatory pricing case, see Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 11.
107 The plaintiff's proof would be analogous in a predatory pricing case.
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reduced the rivals' ability or incentive to compete, by driving them
from the market, by depriving them of funds needed for promotion or
investment, or by otherwise limiting the pressure they would likely
put on the defendant. Third, the defendant was therefore able to
acquire or maintain monopsony power that it would not otherwise
have had and thus could depress the price of the input below, or
further below, the competitive level. Fourth, the defendant likely
could exercise this monopsony power long enough to recoup its
earlier profit sacrifice and reduce the welfare of the input suppliers. 8
Proof of the fourth proposition would require the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the input market was protected by barriers to entry
of sufficient height to permit recoupment and an adverse effect on
welfare.'" These barriers could be structural or behavioral. They could
consist of features of market structure like product differentiation and
scale economies that would prevent or delay entry.11 The plaintiff
could also establish that the defendant's predatory conduct would
itself deter future entry. If the plaintiff attempted to show such a
behavioral barrier, it would have to demonstrate that the defendant's
I'l As presently formulated, the welfare/economic sense standard would
require a predatory bidding plaintiff to establish both recoupment and harm
to supplier welfare. This dual requirement might not be necessary, since in
most cases proving recoupment would be sufficient to show harm to welfare.
See infra section IV.B.1; Kirkwood, su pra note 3, at 661 n.110 (noting that in a
predatory pricing case, every dollar gained by the seller is a dollar lost by
consumers). Nevertheless, in order to reduce the risk of false positives, this
article suggests that a plaintiff be required to demonstrate harm to welfare in
cases in which proof of recoupment is insufficient to establish such harm.
Since the plaintiff must prove recoupment and the defendant is entitled to
an economic sense defense, litigation under the proposed approach would
focus on why the defendant's strategy was expected to be profitable. The
plaintiff would assert that the strategy would not have been profitable but for
its anticompetitive effects, while the defendant would contend that the strategy
was likely to be profitable simply because of its procompetitive effects.
'" If some competitors remained in the market after the period of aggressive
pricing, the plaintiff would also have to establish barriers to expansion.
In For an extensive discussion of barriers to entry in the context of
merger enforcement, see John B. Kirkwood & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., Reforming
Entry Analysis in Merger Cases (Mar. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=976032.
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aggressive bidding for inputs likely created a reputation for predation
that would forestall new entry."'
In order to establish the second proposition-reduction in rivals'
ability or incentive to compete-the plaintiff would have to show that
the defendant's conduct constituted a credible predatory strategy.
Otherwise, the rival would assume that the defendant's aggressive
bidding was likely to be abandoned, and the rival would not
withdraw from the market, refrain from further investment in the
market, or otherwise curb its competitive activities.112
Establishing all the requirements of a welfare standard would
impose a major burden on a plaintiff in a predatory bidding or
predatory pricing case. The resulting litigation would typically be
large, expensive, and time-consuming, necessitating extensive
discovery and considerable expert testimony. This burden alone
might be large enough to discourage all but a few attacks on
legitimate bidding and pricing. The risk of false positives, in other
words, might be reduced to acceptable levels simply by using a
rigorous welfare standard. A welfare standard is comparable to the
full rule of reason used in Sherman Act section 1 cases, and plaintiffs
have had great difficulty winning full rule of reason cases. "3
II See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 6, at 2300-11 (discussing
reputation effect predation and the requirements for establishing it).
112 For descriptions of credible predatory strategies and their
requirements, see id. and Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 48, passin &
Appendix ("Elements of Proof of Predatory Strategies"). Reputation effect
predation, mentioned in the previous paragraph, is only one type of credible
predatory strategy. Other types, which might not be sufficient by themselves
to deter future entry (and thus might be insufficient to establish the fourth
proposition), include financial market predation, test market predation, and
cost signaling. See id.
113 See Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per
Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1489 (1983) ("it is very
difficult for a plaintiff (either the government or a private party) to win a rule
of reason case"). See also id. ("rule of reason cases often take years to litigate
and are extremely expensive"); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST
ENTERPRISE 105 (2005) (litigating a rule of reason case is "one of the most
costly procedures in antitrust practice").
HeinOnline  -- 53 Antitrust Bull. 397 2008
398 : THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN: Vol. 53, No. 2/Summer 2008
Today, however, the desire to avoid false positives and create
clear, workable rules for business is so great that this is probably not
an acceptable approach. In four recent predation cases, the Supreme
Court has imposed demanding standards on plaintiffs and resolved
each case for the defendants in order to avoid false positives."' And
the business community has emphasized that it needs clear, workable
rules in order to make real-time pricing decisions,"5 a need that Justice
Breyer has repeatedly recognized.1 6 If antitrust law is ever going to
reach above-cost predation, therefore, it is probably necessary to
supplement a welfare standard with a practicable safe harbor for
1 See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127
S. Ct. 1069 (2007); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
509 U.S. 209 (1993); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
15 See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Business Roundtable, supra note 44, at 17:
Routine pricing decisions are made by ordinary business people-not by
industrial organization economists. These individuals cannot consult
economists and lawyers every time a bid for materials is due, a contract is
up for renewal, or another of the varied and routine pricing decisions
must be made. Pricing decisions are often time sensitive and require the
exercise of business acumen and insight; they should not require the par-
ticipation of economists or lawyers.
H' See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705,
2736 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (endorsing the per se rule against
minimum resale price maintenance in part because "it creates an easily
administered and enforceable bright line . . .that businesses as well as
lawyers have long understood"); Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v.
Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2397 (2007) (majority opinion by Breyer, J.) (holding
that the securities laws preclude the application of the antitrust laws to the
challenged conduct in part because of "the difficulty of drawing a complex,
sinuous line separating securities-permitted from securities-forbidden
conduct); Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990)
(Breyer, C.J.) (antitrust rules "must be clear enough for lawyers to explain
them to clients"). Justice Breyer has also asserted that without clear, workable
rules, antitrust courts are likely to make significant mistakes. See Leegin, 127 S.
Ct. at 2730 (Breyer, J. dissenting) ("One cannot fairly expect judges and juries
in [full rule of reason] cases to apply complex economic criteria without
making a considerable number of mistakes, which themselves may impose
serious costs"); Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2396 ("these factors suggest that
antitrust courts are likely to make unusually serious mistakes"). See also
William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for
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defendants."7 The economic sense defense is intended to fill that role.
In the version suggested here, it should be as workable as the below-
cost test.
2. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: ECONOMIC SENSE Under the welfare/
economic sense standard, a defendant could escape liability either by
rebutting any element of the plaintiff's prima facie case or by showing
that its conduct made economic sense without regard to its
anticompetitive gains. The second option-the economic sense
defense-would protect the defendant even if its conduct was
harmful to welfare. Like the price-cost test, therefore, the economic
sense defense would provide a safe harbor for defendants."8 In order
to satisfy that defense in a predatory bidding case, the defendant
would have to establish that bidding up the market price of an input
would have been profitable even in the absence of any increase in the
defendant's profit margins due to the creation, enlargement, or
preservation of monopsony power." '
Dominant Firn Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COL. Bus. L.
REV. 1, 14 (Breyer is one of the chief exponents of the Harvard school, whose
main contribution to modem U.S. antitrust doctrine consists of its "cautions
about the administrability of legal rules and the capacity of the institutions
entrusted with implementing them").
17 Several authorities have argued that a welfare test is not sufficient,
standing alone, to provide workable criteria for businesses and courts. See
Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STANFORD L. REV.
253, 317 (2003); Werden, supra note 43, at 432-33; Melamed, supra note 43, at
387; Popofsky, supra note 43, at 478. Contra, Salop, supra note 43, at 363-67.
" While the economic sense test is usually advanced as a standard of
liability, see, e.g., Werden, supra note 43, it has a number of advantages as a
defense. Among them, the burden of establishing it is placed on the party
with the most relevant information.
119 If the defendant's bidding also increased its downstream market
power, any gains from that source would also be excluded in determining
whether the bidding made economic sense. For comparable formulations of
the test as a liability standard, see Werden, supra note 43, at 414 (the no
economic sense test "asks whether challenged conduct would have been
expected to be profitable apart from any gains that conduct may produce
through eliminating competition"); Melamed, supra note 43, at 389:
In particular, under this test, conduct is anticompetitive if, but only if, it
makes no business sense or is unprofitable for the defendant but for the
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The logic of the economic sense defense is straightforward. It
simply asks the defendant to provide an explanation for its conduct
that is both procompetitive and adequate to account for it. That is, it
asks the defendant to explain why its conduct was likely to benefit
suppliers or consumers and why those benefits, by themselves, would
result in an increase the defendant's profits. In providing such an
explanation, therefore, the defendant must disregard any
anticompetitive effects the conduct might have had-specifically, any
impact the conduct might have had on the firm's pricing power,
upstream or downstream. In a predatory bidding case, for example,
the economic sense defense would require the defendant to answer
the following questions:
" How would your strategy benefit your suppliers or customers?
* Would the gains that come from benefiting suppliers or customers
cover your higher input costs?
* Or would those costs be covered only if your behavior enabled you
to disadvantage competitors, gain greater pricing power over the
suppliers of the input (or consumers of your output), and enlarge
your price-cost margins? 2 '
The economic sense defense would be much easier for a firm to
apply than a pure welfare test. The economic sense defense focuses on
the profitability of the firm's conduct, an ordinary business issue, not
its impact on welfare, a more difficult issue that businesses do not
normally address. For example, to determine whether an aggressive
bidding strategy is likely to have an adverse effect on supplier
welfare, the firm would have to assess the existence and height of
barriers to entry and mobility. As many commentators have noted,
exclusion of rivals and resulting supracompetitive recoupment .... The
test ... asks whether the conduct is profitable to the defendant in light of
its (incremental) costs and (incremental) benefits .... Benefits do not
include the ability to charge higher prices, or a downward shift in the
variable cost curve, as a result of the exclusion of rivals.
I2 These questions outline the simple logic of the economic sense
defense. To establish the defense in litigation, the defendant would have to
provide a financial analysis of its strategy showing that it was expected to be
profitable without regard to whether it created monopsony power or market
power.
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those issues are often hard to resolve, especially if they have to be
resolved quickly.121 In contrast, business executives can evaluate the
profitability of their actions-and explain them to judges and juries-
much more readily.
To be sure, the profitability calculation required by the economic
sense defense is different from the profitability calculation firms
ordinarily perform. Instead of evaluating the total profitability of a
strategy, taking into account all its gains and costs, as a firm
normally does, the business must determine whether the
procompetitive aspects of the strategy were likely to be profitable. As
explained below, however, this calculation would not usually be
problematic. The defendant would simply have to identify a
procompetitive aspect of its strategy and show how that aspect, by
itself, would have increased its profits. If the strategy were truly
procompetitive (i.e., if it benefited suppliers or consumers), it would
normally increase the defendant's output and market share,
upstream or downstream. Under the economic sense test, the
defendant must disregard any effect this increase in market share
might have on its pricing power. That is, while the output expansion
might eliminate one or more competitors, the firm must assume
away any increase in its margins due to the creation or enlargement
of monopsony or monopoly power. 122 Instead, the defendant must
show that its profits were likely to increase because it had lowered its
costs by improving its efficiency, raised its prices by offering greater
product quality, or lowered its prices when a price reduction would
be profitable in the short run.1 23
- See Kirkwood & Zerbe, suipra note 110. See also Brief for Amici Curiae
Business Roundtable, supra note 44, at 17 (noting that business people
"cannot consult economists ... every time ... routine pricing decisions must
be made").
122 See, e.g., Werden, supra note 43, at 421 (in applying the no economic
sense test, a firm must exclude "the profit gains resulting from creating or
maintaining monopolistic price-cost margins").
123 See infra note 127 and accompanying text (explaining why and when a
price reduction that is profitable in the short run would be entitled to the
economic sense defense). In promotional pricing cases, a price reduction that
is not profitable in the short run may still be eligible for the defense. See infra
note 128.
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When a strategy is likely to lower costs, the economic sense
defense is particularly easy to apply. Suppose that the dominant
purchaser of an input invests in new equipment that expands its
capacity and lowers the quantity of labor and electric power required
to produce each unit of output. Suppose further that because of this
reduction in marginal costs, the firm calculates that its profit-
maximizing output is now larger than before, even though it must
lower its selling price and bid up the price of the input in order to
reach this higher output. Finally, suppose that in making this
calculation, the firm ignores any impact this strategy might have on
its monopsony power, assuming instead that it would continue to pay
this higher input price. Under these circumstances, the firm would be
entitled to an economic sense defense, and the calculations required
to establish this defense would be straightforward."4
Similarly, a dominant firm could establish the economic sense
defense by showing that it bid up input prices in order to expand
output and recapture economies of scale it had lost because of new
entry. Suppose that the plaintiff enters the defendant's market and
takes a significant amount of business from the defendant, depriving
it of economies of scale and raising the average variable costs of
'2 This example mirrors Weyerhaeuser's defense. Weyerhaeuser
contended that it bid up sawlog prices not to drive out rivals and create
monopsony power, but to exploit an investment in more efficient log-
processing equipment. At oral argument, both Justice Scalia and counsel for
Weyerhaeuser explained how such a strategy would make economic sense:
JUSTICE SCALIA: If you have a firm that has developed a new... technique
for processing the logs, and it can process them cheaper and faster, and
sell them for a lower price but in greater volume, and thereby make even
more profit, that firm would be willing to pay more for those logs, even
though it would sell them for less than competitors might sell them.
MR. PINCUS: That's exactly right, Justice Scalia, and that's what the record
reflects here, that Weyerhaeuser invested in its lumber mills and created a
process that got more value out of a log.... Weyerhaeuser invested [in]
new processes that had less waste, produced more output as Justice
Scalia suggested, and therefore it was able to sell . . . that output at a
lower price and still make a profit, because it was getting more output
[per] log and therefore could pay more for the log.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 25, at 10-11.
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running its plant. Suppose further that the defendant calculates it
would be profitable to increase its output and regain those economies
of scale, even though it would have to lower its output price and bid
up the price of a key input in order to do so.125 Finally, suppose that
this strategy would be profitable even if does not result in any
eventual decline in the price of the input or any rise in the price of its
output. The defendant assumes, in other words, that even if the
strategy were to drive out the plaintiff, the defendant could not
exercise any monopsony power or monopoly power. If the defendant
could establish these facts, its aggressive bidding strategy would
make economic sense, and the calculations required would again be
elementary.
Thus, when a dominant firm has a cost-saving explanation for
expanding its output and raising its payments for inputs, the
economic sense defense would not be difficult to apply. And even
when the challenged behavior would not generate cost savings, the
version of the economic sense defense recommended here is likely to
be workable, as the next section shows.12 6
B. Comparison of the welfare/economic sense
and price-cost/recoupment standards
The welfare/economic sense standard may well be a method of
controlling predatory bidding and predatory pricing that is superior
to the below-cost/recoupment standard. While the answer cannot be
12- That is, the reduction in variable costs from operating at a larger scale
would offset the higher input price and lower selling price.
126 Cf. Melamed, supra note 43, at 393 (the profit sacrifice test "provides
simple, effective, and meaningful guidance to firms so that they will know
how to avoid antitrust liability without steering clear of procompetitive
conduct"). While Professor Salop raises numerous objections to a profit
sacrifice test, see Salop, supra note 43, this article does not recommend a pure
profit sacrifice test, which would require defendants to demonstrate that their
behavior entailed no profit sacrifice whatsoever, i.e., that it maximized their
profits without regard to its anticompetitive effects. Instead, I propose a
simpler defense, under which defendants need only show that their behavior
was likely to increase profits regardless of whether it achieved any
anticompetitive gains. This defense should be substantially easier to
administer.
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determined with certainty without more empirical evidence, the
welfare/economic sense standard is unlikely to be less workable than
the Weyerhaeuser/Brooke Group standard and may well produce a
better mix of false positives and false negatives.
1. WORKABILITY The welfare/economic sense standard would not
be substantially less administrable than the below-cost/recoupment
standard for two reasons. First, the welfare component of the
welfare/economic sense standard is nearly identical to the
recoupment component of the below-cost/recoupment standard.
Second, the economic sense defense suggested here is unlikely to be
more difficult to administer than the below-cost test since it is based
on straightforward profitability calculations that a profit-maximizing
firm would make in the ordinary course of business.
The welfare component of the welfare/economic sense standard
is essentially the same as the recoupment component of the price-
cost/recoupment standard. As noted earlier, the welfare test would
include a recoupment element, and in the typical case proof of
recoupment would also establish harm to welfare. If the defendant
recouped the initial profit sacrifice it made in bidding up input prices
by later depressing them below the competitive level for a significant
period of time, the defendant would normally have caused a net
reduction in the welfare of suppliers. They would have lost more
from the lower input prices than they gained from the earlier higher
prices. While it is conceivable that the defendant's costs varied
between the two periods, and the defendant recouped its profit
sacrifice before suppliers were harmed overall, that would be
unusual. In the ordinary case, establishing recoupment would also
demonstrate harm to welfare, and the two standards would be
equally administrable.
The other elements of the two standards are not identical. While
the below-cost test and the economic sense defense are similar-both
focus on the profitability of the defendant's conduct-they ask
different questions. In a predatory bidding case, the below-cost test
asks whether the defendant incurred losses during the period it bid up
input prices. More precisely, it asks whether the defendant's revenues
covered an appropriate measure of its costs. In contrast, the economic
sense defense asks whether the defendant's conduct was profitable
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without regard to its anticompetitive gains. That is, the defense asks
whether the procompetitive effects of the defendant's conduct were
sufficient to make it profitable. In essence, the below-cost test
compares the defendant's revenues to its costs, while the economic
sense defense compares the revenues from the procompetitive effects
of the defendant's conduct to its costs. As a result, the economic sense
defense entails an extra step-separating the procompetitive effects of
the defendant's conduct from its anticompetitive effects. This extra
step, however, is unlikely to make the economic sense defense more
difficult to apply in a predatory bidding or predatory pricing case,
since in these types of cases it should not be problematic to identify
the procompetitive features of a strategy.
Consider, for example, the two illustrations of the economic sense
defense set forth in the prior section. In both, the defendant would
realize cost savings by expanding output, and in both, these cost
savings would exceed the higher input prices (and lower selling
prices) the firm must incur to expand output. Where a strategy would
lower costs and expand output, these features would constitute its
procompetitive dimensions. And if these features alone would make
the strategy profitable, the defendant would be entitled to the
economic sense defense.
Now consider a more difficult case, in which the defendant would
not realize any cost savings from expanding output. Suppose, for
example, that the plaintiff has entered the defendant's market and
taken a significant amount of its business, depressing output prices
and raising input prices in the process. And suppose that the
defendant is considering whether it can respond to this entry by
increasing output and regaining some of its market share, even
though that would not yield any cost savings. Under the economic
sense defense, the defendant could do so if the procompetitive aspects
of the strategy were profitable by themselves. In this case, the
procompetitive features of the strategy would be the expansion of
output and the resulting higher input prices and lower output prices,
which would benefit suppliers and consumers. And these
procompetitive effects would be profitable by themselves if they were
profitable without regard to any increase in the defendant's pricing
power from the subsequent elimination or suppression of the
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plaintiff. If that were true, the strategy would have to be profitable in
the short run, since the defendant would make no greater profits later
from the demise or decline of the plaintiff. In this situation, in short,
the defendant could satisfy the economic sense defense by showing
that expanding output would increase its profits in the short run.127
Even in this case, therefore, the economic sense defense would not
be more difficult to apply than the below-cost test, since both would
require a determination of the short-run profitability of the
defendant's actions. While the below-cost test would ask whether the
defendant's actions incurred losses in the short run, the economic sense
defense would ask whether they increased profits in the short run.
Since a profit-maximizing firm would, in the ordinary course of
business, determine the expected profitability of its actions in the
short as well as the long run, both tests would be equally
administrable. The advantage of the welfare/economic sense
standard is that it may well reach the right answer more often."
-
2
127 For a similar analysis, see Melamed, supra note 43, at 392 (noting that a
profit sacrifice or no economic sense test would protect conduct that increases
profits and welfare in the period before any rivals are excluded). A focus on
the short run is generally appropriate for predatory bidding cases, predatory
pricing cases, and other cases that fit the traditional predation paradigm, in
which there is a period of aggressive competition followed by a period of
recoupment. In this paradigm, the anticompetitive effects occur only in the
second stage. As a result, if the strategy is profitable in the short run, those
profits can be attributed to the procompetitive effects of the strategy. In raising
rivals cost cases, however, it would not be appropriate to look only at the short
run in determining whether the economic sense defense is satisfied. In these
cases, anticompetitive effects may occur in the short run. As a result, a short-
run profit increase could not automatically be attributed to the procompetitive
effects of the defendant's strategy. In some predation cases, moreover, it may
be necessary to look beyond the short run. See infra note 128.
128 In the types of cases discussed in the text, the defendant could satisfy
the economic sense defense by showing that its profits were likely to increase
in the short run. In one type of predation case, the defendant may be able to
establish the defense even if it cannot show a short-run profit increase.
Suppose that the defendant introduces a new product and offers it initially at
a very low (and allegedly predatory) price. Even if this price causes the
defendant to incur short-run losses, it may be procompetitive if it induces
consumers to try the new product and they find that they prefer it to the
established products, even after the defendant raises price to recover its initial
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2. BALANCE OF FALSE POSITIVES AND FALSE NEGATIVES The
welfare/economic sense standard may produce a better balance of
false negatives and false positives than the price-cost/recoupment
standard. In the first place, the welfare/economic sense standard is
likely to generate fewer false negatives, since it would reach above-
cost predation. If a dominant firm aggressively bids up input prices in
order to exclude rivals and gain monopsony power-harming
suppliers and possibly consumers as well-the welfare/economics
sense standard would ban the behavior, even if the dominant firm
covers its costs. As shown above, such behavior, like comparable
above-cost predatory pricing, appears to be a significant problem.
129
The welfare/economic sense standard may produce some false
negatives, since it is possible for conduct to satisfy the economic sense
defense even though it reduces welfare."9 In general, however, the
economic sense defense is more restrictive than the below-cost test. In
the version proposed here, the economic sense defense would protect
losses. In this case, therefore, the defendant would be entitled to the economic
sense defense if it can show that its pricing strategy was likely to be profitable
over the long run whether or not the plaintiff remained a viable competitor.
In short, in a promotional pricing case, the economic sense defense may
require an examination of long-run profitability. This broader time span
should not render these cases unworkable, however, because introductory
promotions are so common. As a result, it should be easy for courts to
establish benchmarks that would enable businesses and litigants to quickly
determine whether a particular promotion is likely to be regarded as
procompetitive.
129 See supra section III.
10 For instance, suppose that a dominant firm responds to entry with
above-cost price cuts that are extended onily to the entrant's customers. Such
price reductions are likely to increase the dominant's short-run profits, since
the only customers who could take advantage of them are customers the
dominant firm has already lost. These price cuts would also harm consumer
welfare if they destroy the entrant and deter future entry. As a result,
perfectly targeted price cuts could constitute a false negative under the
proposed standard. So might similar, less perfect forms of price
discrimination. Such behavior, however, is likely to be difficult to accomplish.
To the extent the dominant firm cannot confine its price reductions to the
entrant's customers (and new customers), it must cut prices to existing
customers, making an increase in its short-run profits less likely.
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aggressive bidding and pricing only if it increased the firm's profits
without regard to its anticompetitive effects, whereas the below-cost test
would protect it so long as the firm covered its average variable costs. 131
In addition, the welfare/economic sense standard is unlikely to
produce significantly more false positives than the price-
cost/recoupment standard. The welfare/economic sense standard
combines a rigorous welfare test, a recoupment element, and a
complete defense for behavior that makes economic sense apart from
its anticompetitive gains. Together, these three elements would make
it extremely difficult for a plaintiff to win a predatory bidding or
predatory pricing suit when the underlying conduct is not predatory.
The welfare/economic sense standard is also unlikely to chill
significantly more procompetitive behavior than does the price-
cost/recoupment standard. Profit-maximizing firms would ordinarily be
able to determine whether their bidding or pricing strategies are entitled
to the simplified version of the economic sense defense presented here.
Moreover, the rigor of the welfare test and the breadth of this defense
would give firms considerable assurance that their bidding and pricing
are unlikely to be challenged except in the most extreme cases. In short,
there is a sound basis for believing that a welfare/economic sense
standard would be superior to a price-cost/recoupment standard in a
predatory bidding or predatory pricing case.'32
V. CONCLUSION
Recent cases in the airline industry and the timber industry
suggest that above-cost predation is a serious concern. These cases
indicate that dominant firms can aggressively bid up input prices or
1I Or another appropriate measure of its costs. See supra note 59.
132 Although normally an advocate of the no economic sense test, Greg
Werden supports a safe harbor for above-cost pricing because such conduct
"is overwhelmingly likely to enhance consumer welfare, and the tools of
antitrust are too blunt to make it worthwhile to attempt the identification of
rare exceptions to that general rule." Werden, supra note 43, at 419. I suggest,
in contrast, that above-cost predation is a significant problem and that a
simplified version of the economic sense test, when combined with a rigorous
welfare test and a recoupment requirement, would supply a reasonably
precise instrument for identifying it.
HeinOnline  -- 53 Antitrust Bull. 408 2008
CONTROLLING ABOVE-COST PREDATION : 409
aggressively lower output prices, drive out rivals, and then lower
input prices or raise output prices to non-competitive levels-all
without incurring losses. In theory, this behavior could be stopped by
applying a balancing test of the sort articulated in Microsoft,133 since
such a test would condemn behavior that reduces competition and
the welfare of suppliers or consumers even if it does not violate a
below-cost test. A balancing test, however, may not be clear enough to
apply to above-cost bidding or pricing, and without a clear, workable
standard, an attempt to ban the anticompetitive instances may deter
too much desirable behavior.
This article suggests an alternative standard, a standard that
combines the theoretical precision and reach of a balancing test with a
defense that businesses and courts can use to separate illegal
predation from legitimate price competition. This standard would
impose a heavy burden on the plaintiff-it would have to
demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was not only profitable but
harmful to suppliers or consumers. And the defense would be
workable, since it would focus on a routine business issue-the
profitability of a proposed strategy-and ask a question that
businesses would normally have no difficulty answering: was the
strategy likely to be profitable if it created value for your suppliers or
customers but gave you no additional pricing power? In short, the
burden of the welfare test and the workability of the economic sense
defense would prevent the standard from chilling much
procompetitive behavior or generating many false positives. At the
same time, the standard is likely to reduce the number of false
negatives since it would reach above-cost predation.
In sum, the welfare/economic sense standard may well be a superior
method for controlling predatory bidding and predatory pricing than the
below-cost/recoupment standard of Weyerhaeuser and Brooke Group.'1
133 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
134 While the welfare/economic sense standard would be appropriate
whether the plaintiff was a competitor of the defendant or a consumer or
supplier, suits by consumers or suppliers are less likely to be protectionist-
and thus less likely to generate false positives-than suits by competitors. As
a result, courts should be most willing to adopt the proposed standard in
suits by customers or suppliers.
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And although this article has not analyzed other forms of aggressive
pricing like bundled discounts, the welfare/ economic sense standard
may be a better way of evaluating them as well.135
"' Greg Werden suggests that the no economic sense test would not be
"well suited to the bundled rebates at issue in LePage's," LePage's v. 3M Co.,
324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), since such rebates "implement a form of
price discrimination, which can make them profitable even apart from any
tendency to eliminate competition, and it may be infeasible to separate the
profits due to price discrimination from the profits due to the elimination of
competition." Werden, su pra note 43, at 421. Under the version of the
economic sense defense recommended here, however, bundled rebates would
be entitled to the defense if they increased the defendant's profits in the short
run, i.e., before rivals were eliminated or their ability to constrain the
defendant's pricing was reduced. Under this standard, it would not be
necessary to "separate the profits due to price discrimination from the profits
due to the elimination of competition," since in the short run, there would be
no profits from the elimination of competition.
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